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LEGAL PROBLEMS OF DATA BASE TECHNOLOGY
HONORABLE DAVID J. DIXON*
As computers become an integral part of court and business proce-
dures, conflicts will arise that cannot be readily solved by traditional le-
gal theories. Lawyers, acting as planners and advisers as well as advo-
cates, must anticipate the potential problems presented by computers
and provide a rational basis for their ultimate solution.
Courts are using computers very effectively for record keeping pur-
poses. A computerized system installed in the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, for example, enabled the Clerk's office to triple its caseload with-
out increasing its workforce. The court's computer writes routine let-
ters, notifies lawyers of due or overdue dates for briefs, and performs
other simple tasks previously performed by clerks. Additionally, the
computer accumulates new, and potentially troublesome, information:
how swiftly and efficiently judges and reporters carry out their work,
whether delays are occurring in the appellate process, and who causes
the delays. Although this new information aids in managerial and
operational decisions, it furnishes credible, but easily distorted, evi-
dence of malfeasance by public officials. Because court records are
public records, any interested person can scrutinize and is likely to
misread this managerial information. Therefore, courts should perhaps
establish a work product exemption for managerial information sup-
plied by the computer.
The use of the computer to record court opinions has resulted in the
unique problem of opinion error. In a number of states, three opinions
exist: the judge's original written opinion, the official reporter's copy,
and the data bank copy. Missouri, Kansas, and many other states load
slip opinions directly into Mead Data Central's computer data bank,
LEXIS. Although occasionally edited by the judge or a reporter, the
data bank opinion is copied verbatim from the judge's written opinion.
A judge who discovers a mistake in his original opinion is sometimes
* Based on remarks made at the Midwest Computer Conference, April 1-2, 1977,
by the Honorable David J. Dixon, Judge, Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City
District.
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too annoyed or embarrassed to correct the mistake in the file. If the
three opinions do not match, which is the true opinion? In a recent de-
cision, I cited an opinion that had an official and unofficial report which
did not agree.' Because the discrepancy was important, I was forced
to add a footnote to my opinion, explaining the difference. Courts
should be cognizant of the need to determine and establish an official
copy of the opinion of the court.
Another problem regarding data banks concerns who owns the rights
to the bank's design. Data banks contain two essential elements: the
data and the coding which accesses the data and performs the functions
for which the data bank was prepared. Kansas and Missouri built ex-
pensive data banks to store their statutory law, and required the builder
of the banks to deposit a copy of the stored data. The state could then
use the data bank for purposes other than those for which it was origin-
ally designed. When Missouri later attempted to modify the function
of the bank, it became apparent that without knowing the design of the
coding program, new functions could not be implemented. The pro-
gram designer eventually agreed to supply a copy of the coding pro-
gram and the state was able to modify the data bank. In Kansas,
however, the designer refused to deliver the coding program, claiming
that it was proprietary information. In order to modify the data bank,
Kansas had to replace the proprietary codes with costly new codes to
perform new functions. To avoid similar privacy and property interest
problems in the future, the contract for a data bank should allocate the
rights to the program design.
Whoever holds the right to the program design will have difficulty
protecting it.2 Developers of software programs rely heavily upon the
trade secrets doctrine for protection of their designs because no other
legal doctrine is exclusively applicable to software programs. Unlike
copyright and other forms of protection, the trade secret doctrine does
not require publication of the program; if published, the software pro-
gram's design is unprotected because its value rests in its logic, which
then could be easily duplicated. Unfortunately, the trade secrets doc-
trine does not extend to purchasers and is therefore fatally inadequate:
every time a software program is purchased the user will necessarily
1. State v. Gibson, 538 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
2. Ogden, Protection of Computer Software-A Hard Problem, 26 DRA E L.
REV. 180 (1976-77). See also Freed, Products Liability in The Computer Age, 17
JUiMETwCS J. 270 (1977).
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discover the program's design. Clearly, a new legal doctrine must be
devised to protect the confidentiality of computer software. Although
this issue has not yet been litigated, it will surely arise in the near fu-
ture, prompted by the popularity of data banks, the expense of strip-
ping and recoding, and the unequal technical knowledge between buy-
ers and sellers.
It is also likely that litigation will occur between users and suppliers
of computers (whether by lease or purchase) concerning which party
should bear the liability when the computer fails to meet its perform-
ance specifications. Traditional theories of indemnity associated with
contracts to supply a chattel or service may not apply to the derivative
liabilities arising from computer use.3 Although the courts generally
allocate liabilities according to the doctrines of privity or nexus, a
different problem is presented by a corporation which, requiring budget-
ing and accounting information, contracts with a computer service to
provide this information. If the software malfunctions and the service
company supplies inaccurate information causing the corporation to go
bankrupt, who is liable? The computer service may resemble the
public weigher in Glanzer v. Shepher and be liable to the creditors of
the corporation even though the service had no contract with them.
If so, the computer service may be entitled to idemnity from its supplier.
Additionally, the supplier who sold the software and hardware to the
service company may be liable in tort to the bankrupt corporation. 5
Although there are no answers to these problems, the mechanical
application of concepts developed in response to less sophisticated
technology may not enable us to effectively control computer technology
in the future.
On the other hand, the mere fact that a computer is involved in a
transaction should not cause lawyers and judges automatically to seek
new and different solutions. In a recent case,8 the parties concentrated
on the existence of computerized credit information to the exclusion of
the true issues. Both sides insisted that the loss was caused by com-
3. See generally Chandler, Computer Transactions: Potential Liability of Com-
puter Use 's and Vendors, 1977 WASH. U.LQ. 405.
4. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (Ct. App. 1922) (buyer of commodity could sue
public weigher for breach of duty even though the contract to weigh the commodity was
between the seller and the weigher).
5. See Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Mo. 1967) (The requirement of
privity of contract should be determined on a case-by-case basis.).
6. Price v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1975).Washington University Open Scholarship
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puter failure, yet the record proved otherwise. The missing informa-
tion was not in the data bank because an employee misplaced a reel of
computer tape and, without the tape, the properly functioning compu-
ter could not provide the information. The plaintiff analogized the
computer to an employee of Ford Motor Credit Company and argued
that Ford should be liable. Ford argued that there could be no agency
relationship with a computer and that no one was responsible for an un-
foreseeable mechanical failure. Ultimately, the case turned on the real
issue that the missing information was caused by an act of a Ford
employee.7
The need for new laws to accomodate conflicts caused by the compu-
ter is now apparent. Confidentiality protections for managerial infor-
mation about court procedures, property rights in software design, and
proper allocation of contractual liability for computer failure all present
formidable challenges to the legal profession. Lawyers must recognize
these problems and create new and equitable legal doctrines to meet
the challenge.
7. Id.
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